Injustiças epistêmicas e a violência sexual contra meninas e mulheres: sobre dados e fatos

on data and facts

Abstract

This article discusses the concept of justice and its counterpoint to injustice, highlighting the historical neglect of science in exploring the latter in depth. Based on the social epistemology proposed by Miranda Fricker, this study analyzes epistemic injustice as a phenomenon that limits access to and validation of individual and collective experiences, especially those of historically marginalized groups. This reflection is grounded in the epistemic practices that, over time, legitimize and reproduce gender, racial, and class inequalities, resulting in epistemicide and social exclusion. In this context, it is evident how sexual violence against women and children, especially Black women, not only violates fundamental rights but also constitutes a serious form of epistemic injustice by

silencing victims and denying credibility to their testimonies. The study thus seeks to articulate theoretical concepts and empirical data, demonstrating the relevance of Fricker's approach to understanding the social dynamics that underpin sexual violence and to indicating ways to address it through cognitive justice. Methodologically, this research is qualitative in nature, theoretical and bibliographical, and based on the analysis of references from philosophy, sociology, anthropology, and social epistemology, particularly Miranda Fricker's work on epistemic injustice. The study begins with a critical review of academic literature and official documents, linking concepts of justice, injustice, and epistemic practices to discussions on sexual violence against women and children, using an exploratory-analytical method.